An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity by Sour, Laura
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An Economic Model of Tax Compliance
with Individual Morality and Group
Conformity
Laura Sour
Centro de Investigacio´n y Docencias Econo´micas (CIDE)
2004
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50334/
MPRA Paper No. 50334, posted 30. September 2015 04:44 UTC
economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2004 43
An Economic Model of Tax
Compliance with Individual
Morality and Group Conformity
Laura Sour
Fecha de recepción: 23 de febrero de 2002; fecha de aceptación: 18 de septiembre de 2003
Abstract: Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax
compliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this model
both moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explain
four pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditional
model, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses when
individuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives for
tax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv)
individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is a
large number of evaders in society.
Keywords: tax compliance, evasion, social norms, honesty, moral values,
social interaction.
Resumen: Tradicionalmente, el cumplimiento en el pago de impuestos se
ha analizado utilizando el modelo de Allighman-Sandmo. En este trabajo
los beneficios, tanto morales como sociales, que los individuos obtienen
por cumplir con sus impuestos se incluyen en este modelo. Este enfoque
permite explicar cuatro inconsistencias que no han sido explicadas por el
modelo tradicional entre la teoría y la evidencia empírica, a saber i) altos
niveles de cumplimiento; ii) respuestas honestas, aun ante la presencia
de altos incentivos para la evasión; iii) aumentos en el nivel de evasión
que incrementa en proporción a la tasa de los impuestos; y iv) los individuos
son más propensos a evadir cuando perciben que el número de evasores
es grande.
Palabras clave: cumplimiento del pago de impuestos, evasión, normas
sociales, honestidad, valores morales, interacción social.
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Introduction
According to the traditional model of tax compliance by Allingham-Sandmo, both the penalty and the threat of the probability of an
audit make people pay their taxes. Yet, there is vast experimental
literature that suggests that there are people who never evade, even
when the probability of detection is zero (Alm et al., 1992, Baldry,
1986, and Webbley et al., 1991). The contrast between evidence and
theory has provoked many to develop new theories. I combine factors
of honesty and conformity payoffs in the taxpayers’ utility function to
fill the gaps between the economic, psychological, and sociological
approaches to fully understand tax compliance. A multidisciplinary
approach is the solution to instill endogenous honest responses in
individuals, even in the presence of marginal incentives for tax evasion.
Clearly defining how these combined forces affect the decision of
individuals to pay is something that has not been reported in the
literature.
The definitions of tax compliance, tax evasion, and tax avoidance
are presented in the first section. In the second section, I explain how
scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax compliance
in the case of personal income tax. Then, I present in detail the most
reliable empirical evidence about tax compliance. In section three, I
present a large body of evidence concerning the honest behavior of
taxpayers. I review the literature of the single-agent model of tax
compliance to show the extensions that have been made that allow
economic, psychologic, and sociology theories to better explain tax
compliance. In section four, I include in the traditional model of tax
compliance both moral and social payoffs from compliance. This
multidisciplinary approach can explain i) high rates of compliance,
ii) honest responses even when the marginal expected return of evasion
is positive, and iii) increases in evasion with the tax rate at the interior
optima. Section five is the conclusion.
I. Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
In this section, I start by differentiating compliance from noncompliance.
Then, I discuss the different behaviors of taxpayers, namely, tax evasion
and tax avoidance.
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Compliance with reporting requirements means that the tax payer files
all required tax returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately
report tax liability in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code,
regulation, and court decisions applicable at the time the return is filed.
(Roth et al., 1989, p. 21).
On the surface, this is a clear definition of the line between tax
compliance and noncompliance. Yet, tax compliance requires adequate
record keeping, timely and accurate filing of tax returns, and the payment
of all taxes owed.1  Consequently, a taxpayer can fail to comply either
because he made a mistake when filing his tax form, or because he
wanted to evade his tax liabilities from the very beginning. In the first
case, the taxpayer honestly made a mistake, while in the second the
omission was intentional.2  The result in both cases, noncompliance, is
the same, but the motivation of the individual is different. For this reason,
noncompliance includes situations where individuals underpaid, or
overpaid, their taxes (called underreporting or overreporting).
Economists, aware of the differences in intentions, have attempted
to isolate in their models the nuances in people’s motivations and
intentions when they fill out their tax forms and pay their taxes. In
theory, tax evasion is considered to be the willful act of noncompliance
with the tax law in order to reduce tax liability. On the other hand, tax
avoidance consists of procedures to reduce tax liability, which are
dubiously within the limits of the law. These include, among others,
postponement of taxes or hiring a tax professional to alert one of the
tax deductibility of activities already undertaken.3
In practice, the main difference between avoidance and evasion is
the illegal characteristic of the latter: If noncompliance is proven legally
to be a deliberate decision to reduce tax liability, it constitutes tax
evasion. But the line between the two is fuzzy. Consequently, tax
authorities, lawyers, and taxpayers find it hard to agree about the
majority of the ambiguous cases.
1 Kinsey (1987).
2 Failure to comply with tax reporting may also be due to misinformation, misunderstanding
or negligence.
3 Recently, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1999) have analyzed the possibility of studying tax
avoidance and tax evasion as complements.
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II. Theory and Evidence about Tax Compliance on Personal
Income Tax.4
In the economic models it has been assumed that the behavior of
individuals when reporting their taxes is driven primarily by the
incentives of the tax system. In this framework, the taxpayer decides
how much income to report by solving an expected utility maximization
problem, hence, the choice of whether and how much income to declare
is akin to a choice of whether and how much to gamble. The taxpayer
faces a trade-off between the tax savings from underreporting true
income against the risk of audit and the penalties for detected
noncompliance. The threat of detection and punishment are responsible
for the compliance of the individual. This theory stems from Becker’s
classic paper on the economics of crime (1968) and was first applied to
the problem of tax compliance by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
In the simple version of the Allingham-Sandmo model, the
possibility of avoidance does not exist and the taxpayer is risk neutral.
He faces a fixed penalty rate if he is caught evading taxes. The taxpayer
must choose how much income x to declare to tax authorities so that
he maximizes his expected utility.
E[U] = (1–p) U [y (1–t) + t (y–x)] + pU [y (1–t) – s (y–x)]
where y is his exogenous true fixed income, only known by the
individual, t is the constant tax rate, and y(1-t) is the true after tax-
income. The individual faces a constant probability p of being audited.
If the taxpayer evades taxes and is audited, he must pay a constant
penalty s on all unreported income. The solution of the model indicates
that an individual will report zero income whenever the audit
probability he faces is less than t/(t+s).
Yitzhaki (1974) modified the Allingham-Sandmo model by imposing
the penalty on tax understatement, as opposed to unreported income.
In this way, the theoretical prediction is that evasion will increase
with a reduction in the tax rate. However, Clotfelter (1983), Slemrod
(1985), Crane and Nourzad (1986), Baldry (1987), Poterba (1987) and
Friedland et al. (1978) offer evidence of a positive relation between
4 There are other important areas of tax compliance, such as corporate tax law and sales
taxes, for instance. However, I will only discuss the case of personal income tax here because of
space limits.
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evasion and tax rate. Also, there a is vast experimental literature that
suggests that there are people who never evade, even when the
probability of detection is zero (Alm et al., 1992, Baldry, 1986, and
Webbley et al., 1991).
The contrast between theory and evidence has provoked many
researchers to extend the traditional model. These attempts are
presented in the next section. For the moment, it will be enough to
analyze the most reliable empirical evidence about tax compliance:
the Taxpayer Compliance Measure Program (TCMP) of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).5 The TCMP intensively audits individual tax
returns on a stratified random national sample. Even though it fails
to detect certain amount of income sources that are exempt from
reporting requirements —such as self-employed people and those
whose main income is cash— it is recognized as the best data available.
According to the most recent TCMP (1988), 40 percent of U.S.
households underpaid their taxes for that year, 53 percent paid
correctly and 7 percent overpaid. Under the assumption that these
payments were due to error in their tax forms, and that a comparable
proportion of those who underpay are also due to error, we can conclude
that almost 67 percent of the people intended to pay their taxes
correctly.6 Why do people pay their taxes in the United States, if the
probability of an audit and the penalty are very low, and more
surprisingly, why do they attempt to pay them correctly?7
Part of the explanation is the increase in information reported to
the IRS by magnetic media, which facilitates the matching of
documents.8 For instance, the IRS requires that both the employee and
the employer report the employee’s wage. This limits opportunities
for evasion in these cases where the main source of income is salaries
and wages. This is also the case for income in the form of interest,
pensions, and mortgage interest payments. The IRS estimates that,
even taking information requirements into account, individuals appear
5 The TCMP has only been available to certain research projects and not to the general public.
6 Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), p. 820.
7 If we substitute the audit and penalty rates prevalent in the U. S. economy in the
Alligngham-Sadmo model, we find that the model overestimates the rate of evasion. Data from
federal audits in the U.S. indicates that typically the penalty is applied at a rate of 20 percent of
the portion of the underpayment. When s equals .2, and t equals .3, t/(t+s) equals .6, which is far
above the fraction of returns audited in the U.S., about 0.015. These results hold for risk-averse
individuals as well, according to Slemrod and Yitzhaky (1999) and Erard and Feinstein (1994).
8 According to the IRS for the year 1992, 75 percent of the tax returns were subject to
information reporting. Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), pp. 821.
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to be more honest than might be expected. Although three-fourths of
income is subject to information reporting, 91.7 percent of all income
that should have been reported was in fact reported for the year 1992.9
Putting these numbers in terms of the Gross Domestic Products
(GDP), wages, interest income, and dividends constitute around 75
percent of the GDP. These income sources are subject to information
requirements. Therefore, the maximum scope of income that can be
evaded is 25 percent of the GDP.10 These statistics lead us to believe
that the scope of evasion is very low. Yet, given the low penalty and
the small probability of audit, the expected gains for small amounts of
evasion should be very appealing for many taxpayers. This is the reason
why it is impressive to see a compliance rate that exceeds 90 percent
for the American economy.
Up to now the only evidence that has been discussed is from the
U.S. Unfortunately, comparable statistics for compliance —such as the
TCMP— in other countries do not exist or are very difficult to obtain.11
This makes it hard to present international comparisons. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the extent of noncompliance is larger in
developing countries than in the U.S.
III. Theory and Evidence of Moral Values and Social Norms
in Tax Compliance
In this section, I review the literature to show that our knowledge of
compliance behavior is still very limited. I argue that the importance
of moral values and social interactions to deter noncompliance has
not been analyzed in depth. First, I present an overview of the
institutional approach to explain how both —formal and informal—
institutions shape economic and social outcomes. Then, I describe four
single-agent models of tax compliance. The first models how honesty
and reputational cost can deter evasion. The second one considers how
feelings of guilt and shame reduce the gains from noncompliance. The
9 Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), p. 822.
10 This 25 percent is formed by self-employed people —such as doctors and lawyers and
those individuals whose major source of income is cash, such as waiters. In these cases there is
no way to verify the information about their income.
11 For some international studies see Graetz, M.J. and L.L. Wilde (1985), Skinner, J. and J.
Slemrod (1985), James Alm, Roy Bahl, and Matthew N. Murray (1990) on Jamaica, Dick J.
Hessing et al. (1992) on the Netherlands, and Ana de Juan, Miguel A, Lasheras, and Rafaela
Mayo (1994) on Spain.
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third presents how the issue of fairness related to the tax code and
tax enforcement can affect the motivation of individuals to pay their
taxes. The last one analyses how the performance of the government
can affect the willingness to pay taxes.
Economic models in general have neglected the presence of codes
of conduct –such as moral and ethical constraints– that can prevent
people from cheating on their income tax forms. I will argue that the
extension of economic, psychological, and sociological approaches can
help us explain taxpayers’ high rate of compliance. Particularly, this
multidisciplinary approach will allow us to see honest responses, even
in the presence of marginal incentives for tax evasion. However, we
first need to understand the combined role of all these factors in the
taxpayer’s decision.
The combination of enforcement, penalties, prices, income, and
institutions limits the set of possibilities of individuals in the economy.
North (1990) defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction”.12 Institutions can be formal –like
constitutions, statute law, and regulations– or informal –like self-
enforced codes of behavior, norms, and conventions in society.
Individuals create institutions to set the limits of what people in a
certain group are allowed to do, or alternatively, to determine under
what conditions people are not able to undertake certain actions. In
general, institutions also establish punishment and sanctions.
According to what individuals know about how and to what extent
the rest of the society respects and obeys the laws, this information
provides them with the basis for the formation of their expectations
about the behavior of the society. Individuals –based on these
expectations– will make their strategic choices.13
In the traditional model of tax compliance, this view of the
individual’s choices within a social environment is missing: only the
threat of external sanctions (audits and penalties) generates compliance.
The fact that informal institutions can deter noncompliance has been
excluded from the model. If it is true that the threat of external
12 North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
Cambridge University Press (1990), p. 3.
13 My interest is not the study of institutions per-se. I will only consider them as the
constraints that individuals impose on themselves, either formally or informally. There is a
body of literature about the origins, creation, evolution, and persistence of institutions: Calvert
(1995), (1998), Eggertsson (1990), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1998), Kreps (1990), Milgrom,
North and Weingast (1990) and North (1990).
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punishment is important, it is also true that informal institutions —
such as codes of behavior and honesty— can also constrain people’s
choices.14 Kinsey (1987) summarizes the body of literature that analyzes
compliance from the sociological, psychological, and legal points of view,
emphasizing how social norms and individual attitudes can explain tax
behavior. For instance, the moral evaluation of crime affects the level of
deterrence of the legal sanctions. Legal sanctions over immoral crimes
can have higher deterrence because they are reinforced by the
individual’s self-imposed codes of morality.
Sometimes individuals are constrained by codes of conduct, even
though they can get away with violations. Alm et al. (1992) finds some
compliance when there is no chance of being caught. In principle, no
rational actor that sees a wide possibility of evasion would couply, so
there must be something more, besides external punishment, that
restrains the individual from tax cheating. Gordon (1989) incorporates
this result in a model by including nonpecunary costs of evasion in
the utility of the taxpayer. The act of evading taxes may induce anxiety,
guilt or a negative self-image in taxpayers. These exogenous psychic
and stigma costs allow us to rationalize this sort of motivation.
Unfortunately, they are exogenous and cannot explain different levels
of honesty among individuals or social groups.
The process of being audited carries various social risks, such as
loss of reputation among family members, friends, and colleagues. In
an extreme case, an audit can put the taxpayer’s job at risk. People
commonly discuss issues related to their taxes among family members
and at their jobs. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) found that feelings of
shame and loss of respect when people evade taxes are self-imposed
costs that decrease the likelihood of noncompliance. They differentiate
between shame and embarrassment. The former is something that
the individual feels personally; it does not depend on others, while
embarrassment includes peer pressure, family and significant others.
To reconcile theory with this piece of evidence, Erard and Feinstein
(1994), based on psychological theories, introduce in the utility function
of the taxpayer sentiments of shame and guilt, which reduce the
perceived benefits from cheating. In general, individuals respond to
both peer pressure and social sanctions.15 In this way, both conscience
14 Becker (1996) suggests that rich people are interested in spreading the norms of honesty
to the rest of society, for example.
15 Meier, et al., (1984).
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and the attachment to significant others —friends, family, etc.— are
sources of punishment, which like state-imposed legal sanctions, vary
in both their certainty and their severity. The problem with Erard and
Feinstein’s approach is that the taxpayer will not experience the threat
of embarrassment if the people whose opinion’s are most valued do
not discover his crime. Thus, they should incorporate how the perceived
probability of detection by significant others can also act as a deterrent
as well.
Fairness is another social factor that can explain tax compliance.
There are two factors in the perception of fairness. The first one is
related to the tax burden of the taxpayer compared to the burden of
other individuals. Spicer and Becker (1980) in experimental research
found that the amount of taxes evaded increase when people are told
that their tax burden is higher than the rest of the group. Nevertheless,
there is no agreement on the empirical evidence about this point.
Webley et al. (1991) found that there is no relation between the
perceived inequalities and the compliance of the taxpayer. The second
factor is the perception about the rate of compliance among people:
the more other people pay their taxes, the more people will think that
it is fair for them to pay theirs. Geeroms and Wilmots (1985) show a
mutual dependence between evasion and the percentage of the
population who is evading. Cowell (1990) provides evidence of the
relation between perceptions and attitudes of individuals with tax
compliance. Myles and Naylor (1996) modify the expected utility model
to introduce a social custom source of utility. In this way, the individual
gains utility when he complies honestly with the tax law.
The fourth approach to explain compliance admits the relationship
between the taxpayer and the government. Spicer and Lundstedt (1976)
find that taxpayers will refuse to pay their taxes if they feel that the
government is wasting their taxes. Webley et al. (1991) found a positive
relationship between government performance and compliance. Frey
(1992), in a principal-agent model, considers that the motivation of the
taxpayer to comply depends on internal and external factors. Regulation
or pricing mechanisms (external factors) can “crowd-out” the internal
motivation of the individual to comply. Tighter monitoring and higher
penalties can negatively affect the taxpayer’s morale schema, since they
imply that authorities do not trust taxpayers. Cowell and Gordon (1988)
link the two sides of the government budget, income and expenditure,
by introducing public goods. In this way they want to link the
performance of the government with the satisfaction of the taxpayers.
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They find that when tax rates increase, evasion decreases. However,
these results go against the empirical evidence. Bordignon (1993)
introduces fairness considerations of the fiscal system. He rationalizes
ethical norms by making them dependent on the tax structure, the supply
of public goods, and the perceived behavior of other taxpayers. The
perception of the taxpayer about the fairness of the system determines
the willingness to pay taxes: the more the tax burden and public goods
provision differs from an individuals’ moral idea, the less willing
individuals will be to pay their taxes. Borgidnon finds that there is a
percentage of the population that does not evade, even when incentives
exist to cheat.
The purpose of this section has been to show that there is
incomplete knowledge about the effect of moral and social dynamics
on the models of tax compliance.16 A proposal about how to incorporate
both elements in a theoretical analysis of tax compliance is presented
in the following section. A natural question would be why, after 25
years, do researchers keep on modifying the Allingham-Sandmo model,
instead of creating a whole new approach? The answer is twofold. First,
literature and empirical evidence have not reached any definitive
conclusion about the effect of penalties.17 Nevertheless, it has been
consistently reported in literature that the probability of punishment
is important to dissuade noncompliance.18 Second, the model is
parsimonious, which is very appealing to many researchers.
IV. A Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and
Group Conformity
I use the Gordon (1989) model and the Myles and Naylor (1996) model
to include both individual morality and group conformity in the
16 The basic Allingham and Sandmo model has been extended in a variety of dimensions.
For instance, Pecanvel (1979) finds that the inclusion of endogenous labor supply makes the
sign of the response of the reported income ambiguous to changes in the parameters of the
model. Other extensions of the model include uncertainty about the true tax liability and the
impact of different enforcing rules on evasion. For a comprehensive survey of this literature see
Cowell (1990) and Slemrod and Yitzhaky (1999). Nevertheless, all these modifications do not
consider moral aspects and social interactions in their analysis.
17 Roth et al., 1989, p. 6., Grasmick and Bursik (1990).
18 Jensen, et al., (1978) provides empirical evidence that the risk of apprehension and
punishment are a deterrent to noncompliance. Kleppler and Nagin (1989) argue that the
perception of the probability of punishment is different for each line item and find variation in
the rate of evasion among different line items.
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analysis. In this way, the utility of the taxpayer depends on his final
level of income (Y) and on the income concealed from the tax authority
(I).
U{Y} – νI – N (1–µ) I (1)
Where:
Y = y (1–t) + xtI
Y (terminal income) depends on the fixed gross income (y) which is
liable to tax, the proportional tax rate (t), and the fixed probability of
being caught (p). The tax on any income found to have been concealed
from the authorities (tI) is subject to surcharge at a rate s. The rate of
return to a dollar of evaded tax (x) is given by
 1 with probability 1–p
X = {– s with probability p
Hence,
Y = y (1–t) + tI if the individual is not audited
= y (1–t) – stI if the individual is audited
The utility level for a taxpayer who chooses to evade is given by:
UE = Max {p U [y (1–t) – stI] + (1–p) U [y (1–t) + tI]} – νI – NI (1–µ)
                      {I}
The model differs from Allingham-Sandmo’s traditional model in three
ways. First, the penalty for discovered evasion depends on the tax
understatement, rather than on the income understatement, as
Yitzhaki first suggested in 1974. Hence, the model reflects more
accurately what happens in the real word.19 Second, there is a fixed
cost that represents the anxiety the individual will feel for not
19 This modification means that as t rises, the reward for a successful understatement of a
dollar rises, but the cost of detected understatement rises proportionately. In this way, the tax
rate has no effect on the terms of the tax evasion gamble.
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complying (ν) per unit of evasion. Third, the taxpayer’s utility decreases
with each unit of income concealed, as a consequence of knowing that
he is not following the social norm (N). This cost depends on the number
of non-evaders that exist in his group (1 – µ), where µ is the fraction of
evaders in the group (0 < µ < 1). Assuming that taxpayers maximize
their expected utility, the first order condition (FOC) is:
UY YI – ν – N (1 – µ) = 0
Where:
YI = xt
⇒ t E {UY x}  ν  N (1  µ) = 0
⇒ FOC : ε ≡ E {UY x} = 
ν + N (1  µ)
(2)
The right hand side of (2) represents both the marginal moral and
social cost of evasion for the individual (C).
SOC requires εI < 0
εI = t E {UYY YI x}
= t2 E {UYY x
2}
< 0, because UYY < 0
Hence, SOC is satisfied. We substitute I = 0 in (2) to find the marginal
expected return of evasion (k):
= (1 – p) U′ (y (1  t) ) t + p U′ (y (1 – t) ) (–st)
= k ≡ U′ (y (1  t) ) t (1 – p – ps) > 0
t
c
+
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Note that (1-p-ps) is the expected rate of return to a dollar of evaded
tax. In this way, the economic problem of the tax evader is equivalent
to the analysis of portfolio selection, where gross income (y) is the
initial endowment and where declared income and concealed income
(I) play the role of a safe asset (with zero return) and a risky asset
(with return x). In this way, the individual conceals income depending
on the marginal expected rate of return of evasion (k). Thus, if (1–p–
ps) ≤ 0 then k ≤ 0 and nobody evades. If (1–p–ps) > 0, k is positive and
we have two cases: if [ν + N (1 – µ)] / t ≤ k people will evade. In contrast,
if [ν + N (1 – µ)] / t ≥ k people will not evade. In the latter case, we
reconcile theory with the fact that there are honest responses when
individuals pay their taxes, even when the marginal return of evasion
is positive (Baldry, (1986), Webbley et al. (1991) and Alm et al., (1992)).
In other words, people will not evade if the marginal moral and social
cost of evasion ([ν + N (1 – µ)] / t) is greater than the marginal expected
return of evasion (k).
The differentiation of (2) with respect to ν indicates that, at the
interior optima, dishonest taxpayers will evade more:
0<
µ∂
∂Ι
Also, those at the interior optima will pay less if the the percentage
of taxpayers who do not comply increases:
0>
µ∂
∂Ι
Now, we can do some comparative statics to analyze the effect of
an increase in t over the amount of income concealed from the tax
authority (I):
I
ttNv
t
I
ε
ε+µ−+
−=∂
∂ )/))1(((
(3)
SOC requires ε < 0
{ }numeratorsignsign =



∂
∂
⇒
t
I
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First, consider only the term et
xxIyUYYt )( +−=ε
Where
)( yxIYt −=
}{ xYU tYYt =ε⇒ (4)
Now,
xtIytyY +−=
ttYyY +=
t
yYYt
−
=⇒
Then (4) becomes:



 

 −
=ε x
t
yYUE YYt
The Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is:
Y
YY
Y U
UA −≡
And the parameter of relative risk aversion is:
Y
YY
Y U
YUR −≡
Hence,
0   and   0   if   0 ><>ε xxt RA
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Therefore, it is possible to have a positive relation between evasion
and the tax rate in the economy at the marginal level. This model is a
primitive attempt to reconcile theory with the empirical evidence that
I have already described. Nevertheless, it is a necessary step in order
to make some aspects of honesty and group conformity endogenous in
the utility of taxpayers.
V. Conclusions
Traditionally, the economic models predict that individuals will pay
their taxes because of the threat of external sanctions. However,
considering only formal rules give us an incomplete notion of
constraints in society. I provide evidence of the important role that
moral values and social interactions play in enforcing compliance.
There is empirical evidence that supports the claim that norms
decrease the possibility of committing a fraud. I recognize that people
react to external sanctions —otherwise police and jails would not be
necessary in societies— but there is also evidence that shows that
external punishment cannot completely explain honest responses when
people pay their taxes. In this paper I argue that the combination of
economic, psychological, and sociological factors can help us explain
honest behavior in taxpayers. Specifically, I include in the Allingham-
Sandmo model payoffs for both honesty and conformity payoffs. This
approach can explain i) high rates of compliance, ii) honest responses
even when the marginal expected return of evasion is positive and,
iii) increases in evasion with the tax rate at the interior optima.
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